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BOOK REVIEWS
JusTICE AND THE Poor By Reginald H. Smith, of the Boston Bar. New
York, The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching,
igig; pp. xiv, 271.
Unless lawyers are an unimaginative and hopelessly backward-looking so-
cial group, as some unkind critics have asserted, they will find this book 
one
of he most suggestive and stimulating contributions to legal literature that
has appeared in recent years. It touches in a broad way the whole field 
of
the relation of legal institutions and the legal profession to the major 
prob-
lems of society. It demonstr4tes in a most striking manner how those 
who
plan and administer the machinery of the law must awake to the fact 
that they
form the front line of civilization's defense against anarchy. And it 
presents
in most interesting detail the results of a generation of effort to make 
legal
agencies and institutions adequate to the performance of the new duties 
im-
posed by the changing social order. No lawyer can read the book 
without
feeling anew the far-reaching responsibilities which rest upon the 
bar, and at
the same time he will derive from it the most instructive suggestions 
as .to
the exact nature of the difficulties to be met and the degree of success 
which
has been reached and which may be expected from various reforms 
and ame-
liorating devices.
A brief synopsis of the main features .of the book will exhibit 
the very
practical character of its subject matter and its method. And while 
it deals,
as its title indicates, primarily with the problem of justice for 
the poor, it
throws a flood of light on the whole subject of judicial administration.
Three defects in our judicial system are deemed of controlling importance.
These are (i) Delay, (2) Court Costs and Fees, and (3) Expense 
of Coun-
sel.
Delay iA a by-product of cumbersome, complex and technical procedure,
both in and out of court, and is a problem as broad as the law. 
Rich and
poor alike suffer from it, but the poor are less able to carry the burden. 
To
them it often makes litigation impossibe, wille the well-to-do 
find it only
a variable deterrent, sometimes operative and sometimes not. Delay 
tends
to increase as means are provided for the careful preparation and 
trial of
issues. Thoroughness takes time and necessarily involves delay, 
and the
question becomes one of expediency,--where is the point at which 
thorough-
ness ceases to have advantages commensurate with the delay .which 
it en-
tails? The answer depends on the relative importance to the litigant 
of
speed as against correctness of decision. To the poor speed is 
relatively
much more necessary, for delay is often equivalent to a total denial 
of jus-
tice. Hence a-poor man's court should be summary in its methods. To 
meet
this demand for speed, even at the expense of care and thdroughnefs, 
there
came into use the Small Claims Court, the Conciliation Court, the 
Arbitra-
tion Tribunal and the Administrative Commission, in all of which quick action
is an important feature, and in this respect they have been reasonably suc-
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cessful. It is quite clear, however, from the facts which the author presents,
that the real solution for delay is not in separate tribunals for the poor,
but in the reform of legal procedure in general. Certain classes of actions,
such as' wage claims, rent, store debts, and domestic difficulties, lend them-
selves with some readiness to summary treatment, but this is equally true
whether the litigants are poor or rich. Every court ought to have a procedural
machinery adapted to the divergent characteristics of the controversies
brought before it, instead 6f having all classes of litigation slowed down to
the speed of the slowest.
The second common defect, Court Costs and Fees, is one which applies
with peculiar emphasis to the poor. Wel:-to-do litigants find no serious diffi-
culty in meeting this expense, which is in fact relatively small in this country
as compared with other countries where the common law is administered.
It is comparatively easy to provide for remission of these costs in case of poor
persons. If, however, we wish to avoid setting up class rules of procedure
based on class distinctions, which would be likely to prove a political mistake,
it is entirely possible to eliminate all costs and fees, making justice as free to
all as police protection and sanitation, thus carrying the entire cost of the
courts as an item of public expense.
The third defect is the real crux of the problem of justice for the poor,--
Expense of Counsel. And it is this problem-the problem of how the poor
man is to enjoy equality befbre the law in having his rights properly protected
by counsel-that forms the main subject of study in the book.
Three methods have been suggested for solving the problem of employing
counsel. The first is to prohibit the use of counsel; the second is to so con-
duct the case as to make the employment of counsel unnecessary; and the
third is to supply an attorney or his equivalent to aid the poor person.
The prohibition of the use of counsel is the method adopted in some Small
Claims Courts and some Courts of Conciliation. The author demonstrates
the undoubted advantages of such a system when used in this way. The
unique Small Claims Court of Kansas is described and compared with similar
courts which have been established in Portland, Cleveland and Chicago, and
the experience of these typical courts show that if well trained judges are
provided, and if the amount in €ontroveisy is not allowed to reach a point
where rights are felt to be too important to be jeopardized by informality in
procedure and the lack of partisan legal advice, such courts "are capable of
reducing by one quarter the exisint denial of justice," because of their ability
to.handle nearly all wage claims and rhiscellaneous small debts.
Certain improvements, such as power to order a judgihent paid by instal-
ments, authority to exercise a~n informal bankruptcy jurisdiction by bringing
in and ratably protecting all the creditors of a small debtor, and some sort
of auxiliary assistance, rendered to the litigants by the clerk of the court or
similar officer, would, in the author's opinion, render these Small Claims
Courts very effective.
As for Courts of Conciliation, European experience is shown to be all in
their favor, but they have not made much headway in this country. The
author' fears,'.that the.proper compound of common sense and psychology is
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not indigenous here, and that only through a slow process 
of gradual develop-
ment will the idea become so buttressed by custom that 
it will become a vital
element in the American procedural system.
Rendering the use of counsel unnecessary is the second 
method employed
for solving, the problem of the cost of counsel. The 
most striking instance
of this method is in the Domestic Relations Courts, 
where a well organized
and technically competent probation staff, undei the control of 
the court,
performs all the functi6ns whlich a paid attorney might 
be expected to per-
form, or where these matters are looked after by an 
assistant district attor-
ney, or by some other public officer.* There is a marked 
tendency to place
criminal processes within the jurisdiction of such courts, 
in order to secure
more prompt and efficient administration, and this will 
tend to emphasize the
interest which the state has in domestic relations 
and will hasten the move-.
ment .to provide adequate public facilities for protecting 
the rights of all par-
ties involved.
Other ifistances of the invention of judicial machinery 
which will enable
poor persons to safely do without the services of an attorney, 
are found in
the numerous administrative tribunals whose creation 
is an outstanding fea-
ture of present-day judicial development. The most familiar 
of these Are
the Industrial Accident Commissions. They substitute notices 
and claims, on
standardized forms, for the writs and declarations of the common 
law; serv-
ice is had by mail; there are no questions of venue or jurisdiction; 
instead
of trial lists and calendars there are hearings set for definite 
hours by notices
sent out by the commission; the case can be investigated by the 
staff main-
tained by the commission; and at the trial rules of evidence-those 
absurd
anachroaisms by which we turn a common law trial into a professional 
con-
test of wits-are discarded, and the commissioners take 
the responsibility of
protecting the employee in presenting his case. In some 
jurisdictions the
commission takes an appeal for the employee if the-latter 
desires it.
Public Service Commissions are .somewhat different in their 
origin, for
they do not exemplify a revolt against intolerable procedure 
but were estab-
lished to occupy a new field. They do, however, undertake 
many of the du-
ties which Industrial Accident Boards perform in reducing 
the necessity for
the employment of counsel. The thirtieth report of the Interstate 
Commerce
Commissioj for x916, shows that the Commission answered 
about 5oooo in-
quiriles fi regard to legal rights during that year.
It is evident from this summary, however, that these methods 
of dispens-
ing with the aid of counsel;are of limited availability, and 
are really means
for reducing rather than eliminating the need for an attorney. 
In simple
cases before these commissions and in such courts as the 
Domestic Relations
Courts, no attorney is necessary, but where difficult questions 
of law or com.
plicated matters of fact are- involved some expert aid in- the nature 
of coui-
sel's services seems necessary, aind this is sought to be supplied 
tlsroilgh the.
judicial body which has jurisdiction of the controversy. 
Thesc tribunals
therifore represent in part the method of so conducting the 
case that it is
feasible to dispense with counsel, and in part another 
method, nanely, sup-
plying the poor person vith an attorney, without expense. 
We are there-
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fore brought to a consideration of the tllird and probably the most important
solution of the jroblem of providing justice for the poor.
Supplying an attorney to give legal aid and advice is a proceeding kpown
to the common law in the form of assignment of counsel. The author argues
that sinci the assignment plan has proved a dismal failure in criminal cases
(o,.her than murder) and has long been in disuse in civil cases, there is an
inherent weakness in it, and this weakness, he thinks, is the economic fallacy
ol replying upon the unpaid services of willing members of a hard-working
asd not over-paid profession. This seems to be an adequate explanation,
which at the same time suggests the true solution 6f the difficulty.
Where counsel is necessary to secure full justice to the poor, his aid can be
adequately supplied only if he is paid for his services. There are two methods
of providing compinsation,-by private charitable organizations and by public
bureaus supported by taxation.
The Public Defender is -the most conspicuous example of counsel employed
by the state to safeguad the rights of indigent parties. Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia, led the way in this movement in 1913; Portland, Oregon, and Omaha,
Nebraska, followed in 1915; and Columbus, Ohio, established such an office in
1916. The advantages over assigned counsel are great. The Public Defender
becomes an expert in his line, and serves his clients much better than attorneys
chosen at random; by reason of his skill and experience he is able to save
the state much time and consequently much expense in the trial of cases; the
indepeudent position which he occupies results in raisinF the tone of criminal
trials; technical objections are reduced to a minimum; and the undesirable
creature known as the "jail lawyer" tends to disappear.
But there is no reason for limiting legal aid merely to defendants in crim-
inal cases. The problem is much broader. Society has a duty to see to it
that justice is secured to all who need it, and to meet this z6mprehensive duty
Legal Aid Societies have come into the field. The first one was organized
ivi New York in 1876, and tweny-four years later only two others, in Chicago
and Jersey City, had been formed. During the next ten years eleven more
came into existence, and by i918 there were forty-one such Societies in Amer-
ican cities.
The history of the development of these societies is full of interest. Some
are supported in part by.public funds, but most of them are wh6lly dependent
upon private donations. They have constantly broadened the field of their
activities. All but three of them will now handle bankruptcy cases and en-
tertain disbarmenit proceedings against attorneys. While most of them still
refuse to defend criminal cases or prosecute divorce cases, the author thinks
this is a mistaken policy which will rapidly be aband6ned. The majority re-
fuse personal injury cases unless the claims are for trifling amounts, but this
is also criticized as narrow and tending to promote the contingent fee. system.
Evidently the Legal Aid Societies should extend their activities to cover the
whole field if they are to be effective agencies in bringing justice to the
poor.
As to the respective merits of the publicly and privately supported legal
aid agencies, the author is clearly of opinion that the former is the better
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type, which will ultimately prevail. There seems to be no good reason for
doubting his conclusion, As Elihu Root says in the foreword of the book,
"No one doubts that it is the proper function of the government to secure
justice. In a broad sense that is the chief thing for which government is
organized. Nor can anyone question that the highest obligation of govern-
ment is to secure justice for those who, because they are poor and weak and
friendless, find it hard to maintain their own rights." The author maintains
that "Legal aid work is part and parcel of the administration of justice."
Probably nothing would be more effective in allaying anarchistic tendencies
among the poor and ignorant than well conducted and efficient legal aid
bureaus maintained by the government itself. The great drawback to such
bureaus is that the personnel is likely to suffer from politi6al influences. But
this is equally true of all departments in a democratic government, and can
be surmounted here as well as elsewhere.
Legal aid is shown to be a very cheap form of charity. In i916 thirty
organizations took care of over iooooo cases at an average net cost of about
$r.50 per case. In no way could the state derive a greater ultimate advantage
from a- 6omparatively small expenditure.
The greatest present weakness of the Legal Aid Societies is lack of funds,
which would be remedied if taken over by the state, and lack of centralized
organization. Considerable space is devoted to the relation of the Legal Aid
Society to the law, to- the community, to organized charity and to the bar.
From whatever side they are examined they hold out promise of great use-
fulness if properly developed and provided with capable leadership. This
leadership must come from the bar.
The book is written in cleari and forcible language, and is as entertaining
as it is instructive; tle'author never allows himself to wander into vague gen-
eralities, but marshals his concrete data with great skill; his historical matter
is sufficient to serve his purpose, but his chief concern is the effectiveness, not
the origin, of the methods he discusses. He has also made his book an Im-
mensely valuable bibliography of the subject by full citations of all the ilore
important books, articles, addresses and reports bearing on the matters unaer
discussion, and has added a very well prepared index.
The author and the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancemefit of Teaching
have done a great service to America and to the American bar by preparing
and publishing this illuminating treatise on justice for the poor.
R. M SUNDIMLAND.
EXPERIMENTS IN INTENATIONAL .ADMINISTRATio, by Francis Bowes
Sayre, S. J. D. New York, Harper and Brothers, xgi9.; pp. xvi, 2oi.
Mr. Sayre's book was completed betweeti the signing of the armistice aid
the meeting of the Peace 'Conference. If the author were writing today, in
the light of all that has happened during the past twelvemonth, it is probable
that his optimism about cooperative internationalism and the League of Na-
tions triumphant would be much more restrained. Unlike so much 'that has
been written of late, however, the book's permanent value is in no way im-
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paired by the circumstance that it was prompted by an evanescent hope. Pe-
haps it is all the more valuable for having been written before hope evanesced.
The author assumes that .if we are to get on with international organiza-
tion we must be guided largely by experience, and he presents us with a brief
.and very readable survey of international experience in the field of adminis-
tfation. We are reminded at the outset that this is not the -first occasion on
which diplomats have assembled at the close of cataclysmic war to inaugurate
a new era of peace. An interesting system of international guaranties for the
enforcement of peace was devised at Westphalia in 1648 and amplified at
Utrecht in 1713. After the Napoleonic wars this system was supplemented
by attributing an ill-defined supernational authority to the Concert of the
Great Powers. The great hopes of 1648, 1713, and 1815 ended in failure,
according to the author, for two reasons: (i) because the treaties which
,terminated those wars were essentially unjust in their provisions; and (2)
because the nations were unwilling to submit to enough external control to
make an effective international organization possible. The hope of the
future must be realized through a peace of justice enforced by an organiza-
tion with power. The precedents for such an organization, while significant
as regards tendencies indicated, are not otherwise assuring. The author
divides them into .three types: (i) international administrative organs with
little or no real power of control; (2) international executive 6 rgans with
real power of control over some local situation within a particular state or
,states; (3) international executive organs with real power of control over
taIl the member states themselves. The best known as well as the most 'suc-
cessful institution of. the first type is the Universal Postal Union. While
successful examples of this type might be given almost without number, ac-
cording to the author, "the successful examples of the second type, where
substantial governing power exists, are extremely few." The best example is
the European Danube Commission. Others are given, but in most instances
,they seem to have been relatively unimportant, e. g., the international light-
house at Cape Spartel, Morocco, or to have failed to function successfully,
e. g., the Moroccan International Police and the Albanian International Com-
mission of Control Instances in which the third .type of institution has
been successfully established are still more rare. As the author remarks,
."states are so extravagantly tender of their own sovereignty that nothing but
compelling necessity will produce an organ of the third type." The Inter-
r)ational Sugar Commission is by all odds the most significant and striking
example of such an institution. Other examples are- the' international river
commissions of Europe. -The author concludes as follows: "It must be
frankly recognized that up to this time very few international executive
organs with.power have proved successful. The reagn, however, is not to
be sought in any fundamental impossibilities in international government.
The true explanation lies in the fact that hitherto nations, loath to restrict
the exercise of their own sovereign powers, have been unwilling to accord
any real power of control to an international body. The striking fact is not
that succeises have been so few, but rather that in the very few cases where
international government has been sincerely and honestly tried, and where
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necessity has forced the nations to accord to the international organ sbfficient
power, tberresults have been on the whole successful."
In one tespect the title and plan of the book are somewhat confusing. The
title invite$ the reader to assume that only the so-called international adminis-
'trative unions are to be considered, while the plan includes a discussion of
principles of international executive organization in a broader sense. Yet
the Concert of Great Powers, probably the most significant experiment in in-
ternational executive control to date, is summarily dismissed as a failure in a
few words in the introductory chapter. The exclusion is perhaps justified
in a book of this kind, but a more adequate explanation in the preface would.
have been appreciated. In any case, the manner of the exclusion is unsatis-
factory.
The author presents some interesting conclusions in regard to the unanimity
requirement -and equality of voting power. Of the. former, he says: "To
make the assertion that.the unanimity requirement has, in one way or another,
been dispensed with wherever prompt and effective acion has seemed impera-
tive, would be too sweeping a statement of the case; for in a number of in-
stances, where the organ is comparatively small, or where single blocking
states can be coerced into line through moral or social pressure, the unani-
mity requirement still remains. Nevertheless, the fact that in those interna-
tional organizations which have proved most successful the unanimity require-
ment has in most instances been displaced by the rule of the majority vote, is
of sufficient significance to be worthy of serious consideration by those who
would give to the League of Nations an executive organ of real efficiency."
On the latter point, he concludes : "Power to influence the future course of
nations springs rather from inherent native capacities than from rights; and
if an international organ is to accord truly to the world of facts, the member
states which compose it will be given voting power more or less according to
their actual world influence. To give to. states which are unequal in wealth,
in area, in population, in native capabilities, in influence, and in military
power, exactly the same voting power in a duly constituted executive organ
would be to depart far from justice; and no institution founded on .injustice
can permanently endure." The author is inclined to favor a plan whereby
votes may be apportioned according to responsibilities assumed, leaving each
nation free to decide for itself the extent to which it will assume responsi-
bilities. In the opinion of the present i:eviewer, the above conclusions are
amply justified by reason and experience.
It is no pleasant part of the reviewer's task *to point out some astonish-
ing inaccufacies of statement in the author's discussion of the equality of
states. He says (p: 158) that "volumes have been written to prove that au
states, like men, are created equal." An exhaustive search for material on
the subject of equality has yielded nothing more pretentious, outside the
rather meager discussions in text-books and treatises, than a reprint of some
thirty odd pages. It is hardly conceivable that the author intended the state-
ment to be taken literally. He says further (p. 159) that the dogma of
equality is sometimes taken to mean that "all states are equal in .fact." It is
taken somewhat indiscriminately to mean equal protection of the law and
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equality of rights or of capacity for rights, but no one, so far as the present
reviewer is aware, has ever asserted the obvious absurdity that states are
equal in fact. On the contrary, writers have repeatedly pointed out that
states are not equal in fact and have distinguished equality in law and in-
equality in fact with many refinements of reasoning. Again, he says (p. i6o) :
"As some writers have put it, equality of rights must be very carefully dis-
tinguished from equality of capacities. Nations have equal rights before the
law, but not equal capacities." This is an astounding statement for one who,
as a lawyer, must be presumed to understand the meaning of the word
"rights" and the word "capacities." If nations can be said to have equal
rights it is because they have equal capacities, but they may have equal
capacities without having equal rights. The writers to which thd author
probably refers present the distinction in this way. See Carnazza-Amari,
Trattato, 2d ed., p. 477; Chr6fien, Principes, secs. 16i, 163; Fiore, Trattato,
4th ed., sees. 42o-42I, I, 289; Pradier-Fod&ri, Trait, sec. 449, II ii. It is
a pleasure to add that inaccuracies of statement like the above are not char-
acteristic of the book as a whole.
The book was written originally, one may surmise, for the edification of
our delegates to the Peace Conference. The result is a pleasing little volume
which any one may enjoy and comprehend. It may be added that it is almost
entirely free from the raucously assertive style of so much of our recent
"'historical propaganda." It deserves a wide reading.
May not Mr. Sayre be persuaded to undertake similar surveys of inter-
national legislative and judicial experience to date. More detailed and ex-
haustive monographs on the same subjects would also be welcome.
EDwiN D. DIcKiNsoN.
